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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the impact of investor protection on the value creation of 
LBOs. We find that target shareholders’ wealth gain is higher in countries with better 
investor protection. The impact of investor protection on takeover premium is larger for 
LBO than non-LBO transactions. We also find evidence suggesting that club LBOs are 
not priced lower than non-club deals after accounting for endogeneity problem. These 
results suggest that investor protection law may act as an important safeguard for 
minority shareholders in LBO transactions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Whether leveraged buyouts (LBOs) fairly compensate minority shareholders has 
come under intense public scrutiny worldwide. Despite academic research based on U.S. 
data that shows LBO activities on average create economic value by improving target 
firms’ operating performance, employment, patents, and corporate governance (Davis et 
al. 2008, Lerner et al. 2008, Guo et al. 2010), press coverage (particularly in continental 
Europe) has skeptically referred to U.S. private equity (PE) acquirers as “locusts” that 
take advantage of public investors. In continental Europe, German politician Franz 
Muntefering denounced financial investors as “locusts that destroy everything and move 
on” (Financial Times, May 5, 2005) and demanded that his party take a critical position 
on certain practices of PE firms.  
Among LBOs, club deals that involve two or more PE firms bidding jointly on an 
LBO target as a consortium, have come under fire. According to the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office’s report to Congress in September 2008, PE bidders that form 
syndicates in such deals collude “to avoid competition and depress sale prices.” Recently, 
Blackstone, KKR, and TPG paid combined 325 million USD to settle lawsuits related to 
club deals
1
. The proponents of club deals however claim that private equity firms can 
have better risk sharing in such practices. These ongoing debates highlight the general 
lack of understanding surrounding the minority shareholders’ wealth gains in LBO 
transactions.   
According to Jensen (1986), LBOs improve operating efficiency by reducing 
agency problems in corporations through ownership concentration and debt monitoring. 
Djankov et al. (2008), however, show that in countries with weak investor protection, 
ownership concentration actually aggravates agency problems by facilitating 
expropriation or self-dealing. This means that minority shareholders may be expropriated 
by PE acquirers and get under-paid when investor protection cannot safeguard small 
investors’ interest. On the other hand, what minority shareholders will receive may 
                                                 
1
 Wall Street Journal’s reports on August 7, 2014 that three PE firms settles a lawsuit alleging that private-
equity firms colluded to keep down the prices they paid for companies during the debt-fueled takeover 
frenzy preceding the financial crisis, 
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depend on total surplus associated with LBOs. La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) demonstrate 
that, by affecting external financing and governance, investor protection is an important 
determinant of firm value in international equity markets. Motivated by these insights, 
this paper aims to explore the impact of investor protection on LBOs’ wealth gains for 
target’s minority shareholders.  
Lerner and Schoar (2005) show that PE investments are in general, more active 
and more successful in common-law countries than in other legalities. In the non-LBO 
takeovers, Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that investor protection helps increase value for 
target’s minority shareholders. In the same spirit, Bris and Cabolis (2008) show that the 
cross border differences in investor protection also significantly affect bid premium. 
However, the literature has not systematically examined the wealth effect of LBO 
transactions, which is the primary focus of this research. LBO transactions are different 
from non-LBO takeovers in many regards and as a result, their wealth implications for 
minority shareholders may be different. First, LBO transactions ideally isolate profit-
driven deals from takeovers that are motivated by both profit and strategic objectives.
2
 
Second, LBO deals are more reliant on external financing, which provides a mechanism 
through which investor protection can improve takeover outcomes (Burkart et al. (2014). 
Finally, debt instrument as a funding source in LBOs can potentially serve as a 
governance mechanism to limit acquirers in diverting resources as private benefits 
(Burkart et al. 2014). Consequently, LBO premium will be affected by both the legal 
environment and creditor’s protection law which the equity investors are subjected to.  
We use a LBO transaction’s takeover premium as our primary measure of wealth 
gains for minority shareholders.
3
 Because investor protection improves financing 
capacity, safeguard against expropriation and improve corporate governance (La Porta et 
al. (1998, 1999)), we conjecture that LBOs are more common and target shareholders 
receive higher premium in countries with stronger investor protection. Furthermore, we 
expect these wealth effects to have a cross-sectional pattern when comparing LBOs to 
                                                 
2
 This is not to imply that all mergers and acquisitions are not profit driven. There are takeovers that may be 
motivated by managerial private benefit. These takeovers are laden with agency issues that may destroy 
rather than create value. 
3
 This measurement is also used in Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Bris and Cabolis (2008). Because of 
minority shareholders’ free-riding (Grossman and Hart 1980) as well as competition among acquirers 
(Burkart et al. 2014), the takeover premium is arguably an appropriate proxy for value creation in LBOs. 
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non-LBO takeovers. We also expect the same relationship when comparing non-club 
deals to club deals.
 4
  
Following the law and finance literature, we use three country-level variables to 
measure investor protection. They are legal origin, antidirector rights index, and judicial 
efficiency index. We also control for other country-level or industry-level variables, such 
as per Capita GDP and industry concentration. In addition, we control for creditor rights, 
because PE firms rely heavily on debt financing to complete LBOs and a weak credit 
market environment can become a binding constraint.
5
 As such, our empirical analyses 
will not only show relations between investor protection and LBO transaction patterns as 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) did for non-LBO transactions, but also provide empirical 
evidence illuminating the channels of wealth gains that is posited by Burkart et al. (2014). 
Our research thus has several contributions to the existent literature: a clean sample of 
takeover cases such as LBOs, the difference-in-difference tests on cross sectional 
identifications with issues of endogeneity controlled, and a novel examination on the 
wealth effect of LBOs as well as club deals.  
Our sample includes 5,305 takeovers of publicly traded targets worldwide 
between 1995 and 2007, of which 15% (844 deals) are LBOs and 85% (4461 deals) are 
non-LBO takeovers. We begin the sample period in 1995 because LBOs were 
predominantly a U.S. phenomenon prior to 1995, and they were also rare in U.S. after the 
collapse of the junk bond market in the late 1980s (Kaplan and Stromberg 2008). Deals 
completed after 2007 are excluded due to market disruption caused by the 2008 global 
financial crisis. 
Consistent with the discussion above, we find that investor protection is an 
important source of the wealth gains for targets’ minority shareholders in LBOs. The 
frequency of LBO takeovers and LBO premiums are positively associated with the 
quality of investor protection environment. In addition, the premium effect is also greater 
                                                 
4
 Burkart et al. (2014) theoretically show that financing capacity and corporate governance are two 
important channels through which acquirers can improve takeover efficiency. 
5
 Several studies show that creditor rights are an important factor affecting debt financing. For example, 
Qian and Strahan (2007) and Bae and Goyal (2009) find that bank loan contracts vary in terms of size, 
pricing, and maturity with regard to creditor rights. Similarly, Miller and Reisel (2012) find that creditor 
rights affect bond financing terms such as covenants. The effects of creditor rights on LBOs may be 
ambiguous, however: on the one hand, better creditor rights facilitate the development of the debt market; 
on the other hand, they impose stricter restrictions on borrowers.   
 6 
for LBOs than for non-LBO takeovers, as the former generally rely more on external 
financing than the latter. Officer et al. (2010) find that club deals have significantly lower 
pricing than non-club deals. Our findings suggest that the premium for club deals is not 
significantly different from that of non-club LBOs statistically especially in international 
LBO markets.
6
  
Taken together, our empirical evidence is consistent with the view that strong 
investor protection improves minority shareholders’ wealth in LBOs transactions. This 
finding is important for both the equity market and regulators. Furthermore, such wealth 
effect is attributed to two possible reasons: increased financing capacity and improved 
corporate governance by limiting acquirers’ ability to divert resources. Our findings also 
help reconcile the debate surrounding LBOs’ wealth effect on minority shareholders. 
While some research and the financial press highlight the dark side of PE deals due to 
constraints on competition (e.g., club deals), others have shown that LBOs do create 
value in the equity market. The latter could possibly be due to a sampling problem 
whereby the investor protection regime is constant. Our findings suggest that investor 
protection regime has a significant impact on the wealth creation by PE sponsored LBOs.   
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, compared to the 
M&A sample in Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Bris and Cabolis (2008), our LBO sample 
provides a clean test of wealth effect through two channels, namely, financing capacity 
and corporate governance improvements (Burkart et al. (2014)). Second, the evidence in 
this paper complements Lerner and Schoar’s (2005) investigation on the role of legal 
origin on the valuation of PE-related transactions by exploring the impact of both 
shareholder and creditor protection on LBO’s wealth outcomes. Finally, our research 
sheds light on the wealth creation role of PE in the sponsoring of LBOs and club LBOs.  
 The rest of article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background, 
discusses relevant literature on LBOs, and introduces our research design. Section 3 
describes the data and provides summary statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and section 5 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
6
 Not reported in this paper is the analysis using OLS regression whereby the premium is lower for club 
deals. This result is consistent with Officer et al. (2010). However, when we control for the endogeneity 
choice of club deals using 2-stage least square regression, the premium for club deals are no longer 
different from those of non-club deals. 
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2. Background and Research Design 
 
2.1 Literature and background 
During the 1980s, buyout sponsors on average paid a premium of 40% over the 
prevailing stock market price for incumbent minority shareholders of target companies. 
For instance, DeAngelo et al. (1984) report that from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, 
LBO premiums averaged over 56%. Since then, however, the market environment has 
changed considerably, and LBO premiums have decreased substantially, to an average of 
20% in the 1990s. Since 1995, the PE industry has grown to become an important player 
in the capital market. According to the Private Equity Council 2010’s report, buyout 
sponsors’ total purchasing power is currently estimated to be as high as US$1.5 trillion. 
LBO transactions have become an international phenomenon, with the markets in Europe 
and Asia witnessing an increasing amount of LBO activity. 
LBO takeovers have also become a prominent feature of external corporate 
governance mechanisms for value creation. For a publicly traded target, a LBO is a 
going-private transaction
7
 that usually involves a tender offer for a firm’s common stock 
(i.e., a public offer of a specific purchase price at a premium typically well above the 
prevailing market price). A strand of empirical literature confirms LBOs’ governance 
role. Using U.S. data from the 1980s, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) document a link between 
shareholder gains and free cash flow to LBO premiums. They suggest that, in line with 
the classic free rider problem (Hart and Grossman, 1980), shareholders in target 
companies may require a higher premium in order to capture the perceived incremental 
value created by a takeover. Opler and Titman (1993) studies the trade-off between 
reducing free cash flow and increasing financial distress. 
LBOs are normally financed by both equity capital and debt issued on the 
potential target’s assets and future cash flows. PE-sponsored LBOs typically involve 
buyout funds acquiring a controlling stake of a public or private firm, with about 25% 
equity capital and 75% borrowed money from creditors. In PE-sponsored LBOs, 
                                                 
7
 Although LBOs include takeovers with private targets, we exclude these deals from the study because of 
the lack of data on premium.     
 8 
however, agency problems exist between the PE acquirers and the firm’s minority 
shareholders. Given the structure of LBO, investor protection laws are arguably the most 
important factor to safeguard the interest of minority shareholders when they face 
aggressive and controlling shareholders such as PE acquirers. Kaplan (1989) finds that 
abnormal returns are higher (although not significantly so) for LBOs involving a hostile 
third party than for those with no such involvement.  
Furthermore, the governance role of LBOs can vary when interacted with other 
corporate governance mechanisms. Halpern et al. (1999) show that in poorly performing 
firms, high prior managerial ownership is associated with management-led buyouts, 
whereas low prior managerial ownership is associated with third-party financial 
sponsorship of the LBO. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) find that strong investor protection 
regulation designed to safeguard target minority shareholders during takeovers results in 
a higher final purchase price and lower returns to acquirers in U.S. Low LBO premiums 
has drawn much criticism from both regulators and the financial press regarding the 
possible wealth expropriation on minority shareholders by PE acquirers in club LBOs.  
In fact, following the investigations by federal prosecutors in the U.S. into 
possible collusion between buyout firms to avoid bidding war and paying minority 
unfairly low price, club LBOs have become a highly controversial issue. 
8
 On the positive 
side, club deals have the effect of curtailing capital costs and financing constraints. That 
is, instead of PE sponsors having to fund their acquisitions solely with their own capital, 
especially in large transactions, several PE sponsors can form a consortium and pool their 
equity capital and debt financiers. Their purpose in forming a “club” therefore, is to 
overcome capital constraints, achieve diversification, and/or obtain favorable debt 
financing. It is thus likely that the benefits of club deals will be more pronounced in 
countries with poorer creditor protection where debt financing is more difficult to obtain. 
 
2.2 Research design  
                                                 
8
 Club LBOs have even given rise to litigation. For instance, investors in companies acquired by Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts & Co., Blackstone Group LP, and 11 other private equity firms filed complaints in the U.S. 
District Court in Manhattan accusing these private firms of forming internal “clubs” to bid collectively in 
buyouts, a move that can drive down the deal price. This lawsuit, however, was recently withdrawn. 
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As one of the first few studies that examine international LBOs, we start the 
empirical analysis with a comprehensive and detailed sample summary statistics. We 
report the time series of LBO premium at the aggregate level. Here, unless otherwise 
specified, the takeover premium is calculated as the offer price divided by the stock price 
four weeks before the announcement minus one. Specifically, we calculate the monthly 
series of equally weighted and value-weighted premiums from 1995 to 2007 for both 
LBOs and non-LBO takeovers. We then use t-tests to assess whether the two series move 
closely over time based on their correlation coefficients, and provide cross-sectional 
summary statistics for the premium of LBOs, club and non-club LBOs, and U.S. and non-
U.S. LBOs.  
For all takeovers, we investigate LBO premium in association with legal investor 
protection using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the takeover premium. The independent variables of interest are a LBO 
dummy, proxies for investor protection (UK legal origin and the indices for antidirector 
rights, judicial efficiency, and creditor rights), their interaction terms, and controls: 
 
Premium = α0 + α1 LBO Dummy + α2 Investor Protection + α3 Controls + ε      (1). 
 
Next, we address the endogeneity problem with respect to the choice of different takeover 
types (LBOs versus non-LBOs) for different countries (investor protection regimes). To 
mitigate problems arising from endogenously determined choice, we analyze our sample 
using two-stage instrumental variable (IV) regressions. In the two-stage IV regressions, 
we use each country’s FDI as the instrumental variable. In the first stage, we regress LBO 
dummy variable on the IV and other controls: 
 
LBO dummy = α0 + α1 FDI+ α2 Controls + ε      (2), 
 
In the second stage, we regress takeover premium on the predicted LBO dummy variable 
from the first stage, investor protection measure and other controls: 
 
Premium = α0 + α1         ̂  + α2 Investor Protection + α3 Controls + ε      (3). 
 10 
 
The rationale for using the country’s FDI9 as the instrumental variable is as follows.  We 
can expect the FDI of each country is positively related to the frequency of LBO 
activities. It is reasonable to assume that although each country’s FDI is related to 
numbers of LBOs, the FDI itself does not directly affect LBO premium, thus satisfying 
the exclusion restriction needed for valid instruments. 
To test for the robustness of our results, we construct a matched sample for LBOs 
from non-LBOs based on propensity scores matching method that was proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and later used by Heckman et al. (1997). We first divide 
the whole sample of LBO transactions into two subsamples using investor protection 
measure as the divider. We then use propensity score matching methods to match each 
LBO transaction with non-LBO transaction. We report the univariate t-tests to enable 
comparison of the differences-in-mean of premiums between LBO and comparable non-
LBO targets in the matched sample.   
 Next, we examine the wealth effect of LBOs via club deals. Officer et al. (2010) 
show that club deals are detrimental to targets’ minority shareholders’ wealth. Their 
results, on the surface lend support to the popular belief that PE acquirers are like 
“locusts”. However, since club LBOs are different from other LBOs because clubbing 
practice is a deliberate decision made by PE acquirers, normal OLS regressions that are 
used in the Officer et al. (2010) study will not take into account the inherent endogeneity 
problem. We address this issue by using two-stage instrumental variable regressions, with 
country’s FDI as the IV. 
 
Club LBO dummy = α0 + α1 FDI + α2 Controls + ε    (4). 
LBO Premium = α0 + α1 Investor Protection + α2          ̂ + α4 Controls +      (5). 
 
 Finally, we investigate how acquirers’ cross-border deal decisions respond to 
home and target countries’ investor protection using probit regression. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable capturing the cross border deals. We include both bidder 
                                                 
9
 The data of gross Foreign Direct Investment flows are obtained from the World Bank database for each 
country for various years. (Source: World Development Indicators). 
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and target countries’ investor protections as explanatory variables. We control for target 
financial information, year, and industry fixed effects.   
 
3. Data and sample 
 
3.1 The Data 
Our sample of takeover transactions around the world, taken from Dealogic and 
Thomson VentureXpert, includes all takeover deals completed between 1995 and 2007, 
from which we include publicly traded targets in the analysis. We categorize all 
completed takeover deals into LBOs and non-LBOs according to whether acquirers are 
PE groups or strategic buyers. To ensure that LBOs are PE sponsored, we require that 
acquirers include at least one PE firm as a financial sponsor and they have more than a 
50% final stake in the target after acquisition. These data selection criteria are similar to 
those used in the literature (e.g., Axelson et al. 2010). We exclude deals involving private 
targets or divisions of public companies, as well as those worth less than $10 million
10
 or 
with no available data on premium. We also exclude mergers of equals by requiring that 
an acquirer’s assets or market capitalizations be three times greater than those of the 
target. Our final sample comprises 5,305 takeover deals with 844 LBOs and 4,461 non-
LBO takeovers. 
To measure investor protection, we include three variables: a dummy of common 
law or UK legal origins,
11
 an index of antidirector rights, and an index of judicial 
efficiency (La Porta et al.1997 & 1998; hereafter LLSV). The legal origin dummy 
variable equals one if a country is a common law regime, and zero otherwise. The index 
of antidirector rights
12
 is an aggregation of six different shareholder rights measured on a 
range from zero to six, with a higher score indicating better shareholder protection. The 
index is constructed by adding one: when a country allows shareholders to mail their 
proxies to vote, does not require shareholders to deposit shares ahead of the shareholder 
                                                 
10
 Although this cutoff point is arbitrary, our results remain the same even when we change it to $5 million.   
11
 A country’s law system can be categorized into one of four legal traditions: common law or UK legal 
origin, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law. 
12
 Spamman (2009) updated the antidirector rights indices and he finds that results of LLSV (1997) does 
not hold with the revised antidirector rights indices. We also run empirical tests using Spamman’s indices 
as substitute for LLSV (1997) indices and the resulting coefficients change signs, which is consistent with 
Spamman’s findings.  
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meeting, allows cumulative voting or the proportional representation of minorities on the 
board of directors, has an oppressed minorities mechanism in place, allows shareholders 
who represent less than 10% of share capital to call for an extraordinary meeting, or gives 
shareholders preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholder vote. The 
judicial efficiency index, produced by Business International Corporation, rates the 
efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects businesses, particularly 
foreign firms. Its value ranges from zero to 10, with higher scores signaling improved 
judicial efficiency. LLSV (1997) constructed the average index from 1980 to 1983. In 
addition, we use LLSV’s index of creditor rights, which aggregates the various rights that 
secured creditors might have in liquidation and reorganization, to measure a target 
country’s legal protection for creditors. LLSV (1998) find that it is important to capture 
the legal environment for creditors, who are important providers of debt financing for 
LBOs.  
 
 3.2 Deal distributions 
As our paper is one of the first few to study international LBOs, we provide 
comprehensive and detailed summary statistics. In table 1, we report the yearly deal 
distribution of LBOs, the average deal value, the percentage of LBOs in all takeovers, the 
percentage of club and cross-border LBOs, and the percentage of U.S. LBOs among total 
LBOs worldwide and among U.S. takeovers. Overall, LBO deals have steadily increased 
over the last decade: in 1995, only 8 LBOs involved public targets, compared to 102 
deals in 1999 and 143 in 2006. The average LBO deal size has also increased 
dramatically, from $300 million on average before 2003 to $2.59 billion in 2006. 
Likewise, the percentage of LBO deals among all takeovers increased from 2.81% in 
1995 to 25.77% in 2006. On average, club LBOs account for about 30% of all LBO 
deals, suggesting that many LBOs involve a consortium group of PE firms. Not only do 
the U.S. LBO deals account for approximately 42% of total LBOs worldwide, but the 
percentage of the U.S. LBOs among the U.S. takeovers has also increased over time, up 
from only 3.53% in 1995 to 35.78% in 2006. We observe similar trend for international 
deals. In the mid-1990s, they were quite rare but the number of cross-border deals 
 13 
increased steadily over time and peaked in 2004. In total, over the sample period, there 
are 152 such deals. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
Tables 2 and 3 report the industry and country distributions of LBOs, 
respectively. In our sample, LBOs show strong patterns of clustering across both deal 
countries and industries, with the manufacturing industry being the most active, followed 
by the service and retail industries. Similar industrial distribution exists for non-LBO 
takeovers. The U.S., with over 40% of all LBO deals, remains the most active LBO 
country, partially due to the gigantic size of its economy and stock market.  The U.K. lags 
just slightly behind as the second most active LBO market. 
   
[Insert table 2 about here] 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
3.3 Takeover premium 
We graph the time series of equally weighted premium of LBOs in panel A of 
figure 1.
13
 There is a clear pattern of decrease for both LBO and non-LBO takeover 
premium over the sample period. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, LBO premium 
dropped significantly, largely due to the breakdown of the high-yield bond market. The 
average of LBO premium is 25% lower than those of non-LBO takeovers (17% versus 
24%), a result consistent with Bargeron et al.’s (2008) finding in the U.S., in which 
announcement gains to target shareholders are substantially lower if acquirers are private 
firms (e.g., PE funds) rather than public firms. In panel B, we graph the time series of 
premium for club deals vs. non-club deals. As the figure shows, club deals have lower 
premium than non-club deals on average, 13.71% versus 19.23%.  
 
  [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
                                                 
13
 We use the aggregate premium levels for LBOs and other M&As before 1995, taken from Thomson 
Financial. 
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In table 4, we compare premium in LBO and non-LBO deals in the full sample as 
well as subsamples by deal types and countries. As the table shows, LBO premium are 
significantly lower than non-LBO premium. In the subsample of LBOs, club deals have 
an average premium of 13%, significantly lower than non-club LBOs of 19%. The 
difference in the premium is around 5%, which is economically and statistically 
significant. One possible explanation is that LBOs, especially club deals, involve very 
large targets. When we compare U.S. with non-U.S. deals, we find that the former has 
significantly higher premium than the latter, 25% versus 12%.  
 
  [Insert table 4 about here] 
 
3.4 Target financials 
Table 5 reports the summary statistics for targets’ financials and firm 
characteristics. On average, LBO deal sizes differ little from those of non-LBO 
takeovers. Nonetheless, LBO targets have stronger cash flow (EBITDA over sales), lower 
market-to-book ratios, and lower enterprise value over EBITDA. These differences, 
being economically meaningful, support Jensen’s (1986) theory of free cash flow in the 
sense that LBOs can help mitigate agency problems. Among LBOs, club deals are on 
average three times larger than non-club deals, but no differences emerge between club 
and non-club deals in terms of cash flow, market-to-book ratio, or enterprise value over 
EBITDA. 
 
  [Insert table 5 about here] 
 
4. Primary findings 
 
4.1 Investor protection and takeover premium 
We compare LBO premium between countries with low-quality versus those with 
high-quality investor protection in table 6. In each of the three panels, we bifurcate the 
sample of LBOs based on different criteria: (1) those from target countries with and 
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without UK legal origin, (2) those above and below the median value of the antidirector 
rights index, and (3) those above and below the median value of the judicial efficiency 
index, respectively. The LBO premium is significantly higher in deals with higher levels 
of investor protection than in deals with lower investor protection. Their differences are 
significant in both the mean and median tests using t-tests and the Wilcoxon tests. The 
results reported in table 6 suggest that investor protection has an important impact on 
LBO premium; namely, that better investor protection improves target minority 
shareholder’s wealth gain as measured by shareholders’ takeover premium. 
 
  [Insert table 6 about here] 
 
Given that LBOs are different from non-LBO takeovers, we now conduct 
multivariate analysis of LBO premiums to capture the difference-in-difference. For the 
sample including all takeover deals, we conduct OLS regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the takeover premium, calculated as the percentage difference between the 
offer price and target stock price one month prior to the announcement. The explanatory 
variables of interest are (1) a dummy for LBOs which equals one if a deal is sponsored by 
PE firms and zero otherwise; (2) investor protection variables include legal origin 
dummy, anti-director rights index, judicial efficiency index, and creditor rights index; and 
(3) the interaction terms between the LBO dummy and investor protection variables. 
Other control variables include the logarithm of target market capitalization; the 
interaction term between the LBO dummy and the logarithm of market capitalization; a 
cross-border dummy; target firm’s industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and the target’s 
EBITDA/sales, market-to-book ratio, and enterprise value/EBITDA. We control for the 
year, industry, and/or country fixed effects for all of the regression analyses. The 
estimation of standard errors are clustered by the target country and reported in 
parentheses. 
As table 7 shows, the LBO dummy has a negative coefficient in all regressions, 
ranging from -7% to -12%, which suggests that LBO target shareholders receive 
substantially lower premium than target shareholders of non-buyout takeover deals. In 
general, the takeover premium of small targets is lower than larger targets, but this 
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pattern is reversed in LBOs. Consistent with the previous univariate tests, the differences 
in takeover premium between LBOs and non-LBO takeovers are economically and 
statistically significant. Likewise, the index of antidirector rights, which proxy for equity 
investor protection, has significantly positive coefficients: one standard deviation 
increase in antidirector rights is associated with a more than 5% increase in takeover 
premium. The U.K. legal origin dummy is also positively associated with takeover 
premium. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction term between the LBO dummy 
and the antidirector rights index is positive and significant, whereas the coefficient of the 
interaction term between the LBO dummy and the judicial efficiency index, although 
positive, is marginally significant at the 10% level. The index of creditor rights and the 
interaction term between the LBO dummy and creditor rights, on the other hand, is 
negatively associated with takeover premium.  
Overall, our results suggest that a strong investor protection environment in 
takeovers improves target shareholders’ wealth gains. Furthermore, consistent with the 
external financing channel argument, the improvement is larger for LBOs than for non-
LBO takeovers. Nevertheless, the significant negative relation between premium and 
creditor rights is consistent with our explanation: strong creditor rights may help mitigate 
the conflict between creditors and shareholders. In countries with higher creditor rights 
index, equity shareholder’s gain from wealth transfer from debtors is limited. It is also 
likely that acquirers’ financing flexibility is reduced, especially for LBO deals.  
  
[Insert table 7 about here] 
  
4.2 Control for the endogeneity issue of takeover types 
It is a valid concern that the choice of LBO takeovers may be endogenously 
determined. In order to control for this endogeneity problem, we use two-stage 
instrumental variable regressions. In the first stage regressions, the dependent variable is 
one if a takeover deal is a LBO and zero otherwise, and we use FDI as the instrumental 
variable in the first stage regression. The other independent variables include the 
logarithm of target sales, the target country’s GDP per capita and year and industry fixed 
dummy.  
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In the second stage OLS regression, the dependent variable is takeover premium. 
The independent variables of interest is predicted LBO dummy from the first stage 
regression, and other controls include the logarithm of target market capitalization, 
various country-level investor protection variables, and target firm’s Herfindahl index. 
Once again, we control for the year, industry, and/or country fixed effects for all the 
regression analyses. We also control for correlation in the error terms from the OLS 
regressions using clustering on the target countries. The heteroscedasticity robust 
standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 
   [Insert table 8 here] 
 
The first stage regression shows that logarithm of FDI is significantly positively 
related to LBO deals. Target’s sales are also positively and significantly associated with 
deals that are LBOs. The p-value of Wald test shows that the choice of using FDI as the 
instrument is reasonable.  Results from the second stage regression are reported in table 
8. It shows that the investor protection variables are important determinants of LBO 
premium. For example, the index of antidirector rights is positively and significantly 
associated with takeover premium. The coefficient on the judicial efficiency index is also 
positive and marginally significant. The coefficient on the U.K. legal origin dummy, 
however for one of the specifications, is negative and not statistically significant. The 
LBO dummy is negatively associated with takeover premium. Target Herfindahl index is 
negatively but insignificant. The predicted LBO dummy is negatively associated with 
takeover premium with estimated coefficients ranging from 6-8% on average.  
In order to test the robustness of the above mentioned results, we construct a 
matched sample based on the propensity score. We first divide the whole sample of LBO 
transactions into two subsamples by the level of investor protection. We then use 
propensity score matching methods to match each LBO transaction with non-LBO 
transaction. Using bootstrap method, each treatment deal is matched with Gaussian 
Kernnel using 50 bootstrap replications. The instruments used are target’s market 
capitalization, EBITDA over sales, market-to-book ratio, the index of anti-director rights, 
UK legal origin, and the judicial efficiency index, interest expenses margin, gross profit 
 18 
margin, and enterprise value margin. For each treatment deal, we then adjust the premium 
by subtracting the controlling firms’ premium. We then compare the adjusted premium 
(premium difference between treatment sample and controlling sample) across investor 
protection.  
 
  [Insert Table 9] 
 
As table 9 shows, the adjusted mean and median premium is negative in all 
subsamples but with smaller magnitude in countries with good investor protection, e.g., 
common law legal origin, above median anti-director rights, or above median judicial 
efficiency. In countries with good investor protection, the adjusted premium of treatment 
group ranges from -7.79% to -11.74%, but the in countries with poor investor protection, 
the adjusted premium ranges from -12.84% to -21.64%. The cross-subsample 
comparisons of the mean of the adjusted premiums are mostly significant at either 1% or 
5% level.    
The difference-in-difference findings from the propensity matching methods 
suggest that acquirers in LBOs pay significantly lower premium than non-LBO acquirers. 
The differences are robust to the endogeneity concerns. The difference however is 
smaller in countries with better investor protection. Overall, the findings in tables 8 and 9 
suggest that investor protection improves value creation and wealth of targets’ minority 
shareholders and the improvement is larger for LBOs than non-LBO transactions. 
 
4.3 Investor protection and club deals  
In this subsection, we focus solely on LBOs and analyze how investor protection 
environment influence LBO premium. We employ two-stage IV regressions to control for 
the endogenously determined choice of using club deals. In the first stage regression, the 
dependent variable is one if a takeover deal is club LBO and zero otherwise, and the 
instrument variable is each country’s FDI. The other independent variables include the 
logarithm of target sales, the target country’s GDP per capita and year and industry fixed 
dummy. In the second stage OLS regression, the dependent variable is LBO premium. 
The independent variables of interest is club LBO dummy predicted from the first stage 
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regression, and control variables include the logarithm of target market capitalization, 
various country-level investor protection variables, and target firm’s Herfindahl index. 
We control for the year, industry, and/or country fixed effects for all the regression 
analyses. We also control for correlation in the error terms from the OLS regressions 
using clustering on the target countries. The heteroscedasticity robust standard deviations 
are reported in parentheses. 
As shown in columns 1 and 2 of table 10, the first stage IV regression shows that 
logarithm of FDI is significantly positively related to a takeover deal to be a club LBO 
transaction. Target’s sales are also positively and significantly associated with a deal to 
be a club LBO transaction. In the second stage regression, LBO premium is positively 
and significantly associated with the antidirector rights index but negatively with the 
creditor rights index, the UK legal origin dummy has a negative coefficient, and the 
judicial efficiency index have positive and significant coefficient estimate. There is a 
positive but insignificant association between the predicted club deal dummy and LBO 
premium, which suggest that Officer et al.’s (2010) finding of significantly lower LBO 
premium in U.S. club deals may not exist when endogeneity choice of club LBOs are 
being controlled for.  
 
  [Insert table 10 about here] 
 
For robustness check, we perform the same regression by excluding U.S. target 
firms. The results are similar to that of the full sample. Overall, our findings may help 
mitigate negative impression formed by the public on club deals. Our results show that 
club deals do not generate higher or lower takeover premium which is contrary to popular 
belief that these types of deals destroy target shareholders’ wealth.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 This paper examines the economic effects of investor protection on the 
international LBOs with the focus on its role in safeguarding or improving target 
minority shareholders’ wealth gains. We find that LBO premium is positively associated 
with equity investor protection, suggesting that better legal protection for equity investors 
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helps to bring more wealth to target minority shareholders in takeovers, especially in 
LBOs.  
We also find evidence that the premium improvement associated with investor 
protection is larger for LBOs than for other type of takeovers. This result is robust to the 
endogenous decision of takeover types. It suggests that target minority shareholder’s 
wealth in LBOs is more sensitive to investor protection regimes, arguably due to its more 
reliance on external financing.   
In the case of club LBOs, a controversial practice in the U.S. because of 
regulator’s suspicions of collusion among PE acquirers to expropriate minority investors, 
we find that club LBO premium is neither higher nor lower than non-club deals. 
Therefore, our findings suggest that club deals are not necessarily associated with 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Rather, the wealth gains for minority 
shareholders depend more on a target country’s legal investor protection environment.  
The difference-in-difference results mentioned above between LBOs and non-
LBOs support Burkart et al., (2014)’s theoretical conjecture that takeovers can have 
greater wealth outcomes through improved external financing capacity and better 
corporate governance. Our research makes a valuable contribution to the literature by 
enhancing the understanding of wealth implications for minority shareholders in LBOs 
transactions. We also show that investor protection is particularly important for targets’ 
minority shareholders. 
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Table 1: Yearly Distribution of LBOs 
 
This table presents the distribution of 844 LBOs and 4,461 non-LBO takeovers over the sample period 
1995–2007. The sample, obtained from Dealogic, excludes M&As that involve private targets, divisions of 
public companies, a deal value less than $10 million, and deals with no premium data reported or an 
acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. Columns 2 and 3 present the number of LBOs and the average LBO 
deal value for each year, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 show the percentage of LBOs in all takeovers in 
terms of both number and total deal value, respectively. Columns 6 and 7 give the number of club LBOs 
and cross-border LBOs, respectively. Column 8 reports the percentage of U.S. LBOs among world LBOs, 
and column 9 shows the percentage of U.S. LBO among total U.S. takeovers. 
 
Year 
LBOs 
around 
world  
Average 
LBO deal 
value     
($million) 
LBO 
percentage 
in all 
takeovers 
LBO 
value 
percentage 
in all 
takeovers 
CLUB 
LBO deal  
Cross-
border 
LBO  
U.S. 
LBOs 
percentage 
in world 
LBOs 
U.S. 
LBOs in 
all U.S. 
takeovers 
1995 8 677.05 2.81% 2.48% 2 1 75.00% 3.53% 
1996 6 373.32 7.59% 4.90% 3 1 100.00% 13.64% 
1997 30 425.38 11.81% 10.28% 9 6 80.00% 18.46% 
1998 61 323.98 11.57% 7.14% 16 18 59.02% 15.00% 
1999 102 430.41 14.11% 4.66% 18 16 46.08% 15.11% 
2000 81 463.98 11.74% 5.58% 12 11 38.27% 11.27% 
2001 57 422.67 11.52% 6.62% 12 12 42.11% 12.06% 
2002 52 522.12 14.53% 14.52% 23 14 42.31% 15.38% 
2003 87 420.09 23.90% 20.19% 24 15 34.48% 30.61% 
2004 69 973.29 21.63% 19.34% 30 20 37.68% 48.15% 
2005 99 1140.28 21.20% 18.28% 44 15 54.55% 31.58% 
2006 143 2589.80 25.77% 39.88% 41 13 58.04% 35.78% 
2007 49 767.79 25.93% 25.91% 10 10 40.82% 26.67% 
AVG 64.92 733.09 15.70% 13.83% 18.77 11.69 54.49% 21.33% 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Target Industry Distribution 
 
This table gives the summary statistics for target industry distribution. The sample contains 844 LBOs 
worldwide and 4,461 non-LBO takeovers from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers that involve private 
targets, divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals with no premium 
data reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. We report the industry distributions in descending 
order of LBO deal frequency, together with the average deal value and average premiums for both LBOs 
and non-LBO takeovers. 
 
 
LBOs Non-LBO Takeovers 
Industry Sector 
Frequency in 
deal number 
(%) 
Average 
deal value 
($ Million) 
Premium 
(%)  
Frequency 
(%) 
Average 
deal value 
($ Million) 
Premium 
(%)  
Manufacturing 39.62 647.19 17.32 38.51 1057.89 25.42 
Services 28.06 748.30 19.14 23.12 439.44 28.90 
Retails 11.61 1183.56 21.59 6.08 483.53 19.06 
Wholesale 6.45 504.64 16.51 5.36 374.60 31.22 
Communications 3.87 2596.32 12.23 3.72 3174.77 23.89 
Transportation 2.06 1751.21 14.07 2.84 907.42 22.37 
Electricity and Gas 1.91 2735.77 38.41 2.79 2756.06 18.96 
Construction 1.67 839.31 9.43 2.30 396.94 19.24 
Real Estate 1.67 5625.16 13.74 2.45 1245.66 9.64 
Mining and 
Agriculture 
1.55 783.40 20.57 11.06 983.65 21.23 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Target Country Distribution 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for target country distribution. The sample contains 844 LBOs 
worldwide and 4,461 non-LBO takeovers from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers that involve private 
targets, divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals with no premium 
data reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. We report the country distributions in descending 
order of LBO deal frequency with the most frequent LBO deals. The table also reports the average deal 
value and average premium for LBOs and non-LBO takeovers. 
  
 LBOs Non-LBO Takeovers 
Deal 
Country 
Frequency 
in deal 
number 
(%) 
Frequency 
in total 
deal value 
(%) 
Average 
deal value 
($ million) 
Premium 
(%) 
Frequency 
in deal 
number 
(%) 
Frequency 
in total 
deal value 
(%) 
Average 
deal value 
($ million) 
Premium 
(%) 
USA 42.97 63.24 1141.57 25.62 31.07 41.92 953.41 30.55 
UK 18.52 16.59 769.72 11.76 13.34 16.85 847.28 18.71 
France 5.20 2.53 478.97 12.79 3.84 6.44 1396.28 16.36 
Germany 4.84 1.63 348.49 9.04 2.96 6.47 1701.75 13.91 
Canada 4.01 2.84 622.89 22.21 8.83 6.63 567.24 21.37 
Japan 3.92 1.15 206.81 9.95 6.44 3.78 526.33 10.11 
Australia 1.95 0.66 239.11 13.24 5.33 3.42 488.52 21.45 
Italy 1.94 0.43 366.10 2.22 1.97 1.59 757.52 8.46 
Denmark 1.37 2.98 1814.44 12.84 1.41 0.82 507.00 18.86 
Sweden 1.37 1.14 1112.79 21.06 1.97 1.14 521.98 24.79 
Ireland 1.31 1.32 782.47 49.15 0.34 0.32 678.72 45.73 
Netherla
nd 
1.20 2.48 1604.60 26.08 0.82 3.29 2836.63 30.80 
Norway 0.72 0.24 255.47 12.16 1.08 1.01 751.94 28.81 
Spain 0.60 1.46 1889.23 7.78 0.37 1.03 1978.76 9.61 
N. 
Zealand 
0.48 0.09 155.57 16.98 0.44 0.19 311.38 60.12 
S. Africa 0.36 0.23 510.23 22.57 0.68 0.57 595.88 34.24 
Belgium 0.36 0.24 530.41 21.72 0.37 0.97 1846.12 28.20 
Finland 0.24 0.15 475.69 14.62 0.33 0.35 756.14 32.13 
Greece 0.24 0.21 676.74 0.32 0.31 0.70 546.47 0.29 
Hong 
Kong 
0.24 0.01 26.89 10.08 1.31 0.24 377.51 36.66 
Others 7.16 1.34 145.04 8.03 17.79 3.27 129.77 14.79 
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 Table 4: Summary Statistics on Premiums  
 
This table presents summary statistics on takeover premiums. The sample contains 844 LBOs worldwide 
and 4,461 non-LBO takeovers from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers that involve private targets, 
divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals with no premium data 
reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. The table reports the summary statistics on cross-
sectional premiums for LBOs versus other takeovers, for club versus non-club LBOs, and for U.S. versus 
non-U.S. LBOs. The last column lists the p-values of the mean differences derived from a t-test. 
 
 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD p-Value 
 LBOs Non-LBO Takeovers Difference 
Premium calculated at 1 day 
pre-announcement 
17.25 13.98 30.48 23.62 16.00 42.83 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 week 
pre-announcement 
22.25 17.24 32.25 29.84 20.42 44.08 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 month 
pre-announcement 
28.19 22.28 45.95 37.65 25.47 53.09 0.00 
 Club LBOs Non-Club LBOs Difference 
Premium calculated at 1 day 
pre-announcement 
13.71 12.82 22.34 19.32 14.60 30.67 0.03 
Premium calculated at 1 week 
pre-announcement 
16.31 15.75 23.93 23.38 18.13 32.33 0.01 
Premium calculated at 1 month 
pre-announcement 
26.35 19.31 71.06 28.39 23.93 37.59 0.63 
 U.S. LBOs Non-U.S. LBOs Difference 
Premium calculated at 1 day 
pre-announcement 
25.53 20.67 29.43 12.05 10.24 27.12 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 week 
pre-announcement 
29.07 23.66 31.12 15.69 13.42 28.89 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 month 
pre-announcement 
35.17 28.25 55.59 21.44 19.57 37.31 0.00 
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Table 5: Summary Statistics on Target Financials 
 
This table summarized target firms’ characteristics. The sample contains 844 LBOs worldwide and 4,461 
non-LBO takeovers from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers that involve private targets, divisions of 
public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals with no premium data reported or an 
acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. The table reports the summary statistics on deal value, earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over sales, the market-to-book ratio, and enterprise 
value over EBITDA (all measured at the last 12 months before the announcement date). The last column 
lists the p-values of the mean differences derived from a t-test. 
 
 Mean Median SD Mean Median SD p-Value 
 LBOs Non-LBO Takeovers Difference 
Deal value ($ million) 948.68 191.10 2541.01 810.32 118.00 3511.20 0.83 
EBITDA/sale (%) 21.63 10.40 269.16 -4.56 9.44 509.51 0.21 
Market-to-book ratio  1.09 0.76 1.70 4.51 0.70 61.42 0.10 
Enterprise value/EBITDA 15.13 9.66 37.17 23.79 11.51 61.94 0.00 
 Club LBOs Non-Club LBOs Difference 
Deal value ($ million) 2115.61 597.31 3755.02 676.76 173.07 2405.58 0.00 
EBITDA/sale (%) 8.76 11.96 29.01 6.66 10.22 335.11 0.54 
Market-to-book ratio 1.31 0.87 1.49 1.05 0.74 2.66 0.13 
Enterprise value/EBITDA 16.18 11.29 31.42 14.73 9.48 38.85 0.32 
 U.S. LBOs Non-U.S. LBOs Difference 
Deal value ($ million) 1217.64 289.24 3514.48 1095.64 682.02 176.67 0.00 
EBITDA/sale (%) 9.76 11.27 58.06 9.11 10.49 66.53 0.97 
Market-to-book ratio  1.03 0.76 1.76 1.13 0.79 1.61 0.44 
Enterprise value/EBITDA  15.48 9.88 26.44 15.16 9.65 28.70 0.88 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of LBO Premiums and Investor Protection 
 
This table presents summary statistics on LBO premiums according to the quality of investor protection. 
The sample includes 844 worldwide LBOs from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers that involve private 
targets, divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals with no premium 
data reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. Three measures of investor protection are included: 
UK legal origin, being above or below the median value of the anti-director rights index, and being above 
or below the median value of the judicial efficiency index. 
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Mean 
Difference 
 UK legal origin Other legal origin p-Value 
Premium calculated at 1 day pre-
announcement 
18.89 14.05 9.06 6.78 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 week pre-
announcement 
21.96 16.92 12.04 10.42 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 month pre-
announcement 
28.43 21.87 16.18 15.42 0.00 
 Good anti-director 
rights index 
(above median) 
Poor anti-director 
rights index 
(below median) 
p-Value 
Premium calculated at 1 day pre-
announcement 
14.14 2.65 2.65 0.96 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 week pre-
announcement 
16.95 5.25 5.25 3.91 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 month pre-
announcement 
23.25 11.86 11.86 9.25 0.00 
 Good judicial 
efficiency index 
(above mean) 
Poor judicial 
efficiency index 
(below mean) 
p-Value 
Premium calculated at 1 day pre-
announcement 
14.75 11.96 5.11 1.93 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 week pre-
announcement 
17.67 15.06 7.47 5.78 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 month pre-
announcement 
24.71 20.02 11.71 10.25 0.00 
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Table 7: Multivariate Regression for Takeover Premiums 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions on the LBO premium. The sample includes 844 LBOs 
worldwide and 4,461 other takeovers from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers that involve private targets, 
divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals with no premium data 
reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. The dependent variable is the premium (in percentage) 
for takeover targets measured by the offer price divided by the market price closed at one month prior to 
the announcement. The independent variables include the logarithm of the deal size, the logarithm of target 
market capitalization, the debt-to-equity ratio, EBITDA over sales, the market-to-book ratio, enterprise 
value over EBITDA, a cross-border dummy, the anti-director rights and creditor rights indices, a UK legal 
origin dummy, the judicial efficiency index, the logarithm of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 
and target Herfindahl index. We use clustered regressions that control for year, industry, and country fixed 
effects and report the robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
 1 2 3 4 
LBO Dummy 
-9.93*** 
(3.85) 
-11.75*** 
(2.93) 
-6.14** 
(3.12) 
-8.95** 
(2.24) 
Log(Market Capitalization) 
-3.24*** 
(6.51) 
-3.54*** 
(6.87) 
-4.58*** 
(4.51) 
-3.59*** 
(4.42) 
LBO Dummy*Log(Market 
Capitalization) 
 
2.85* 
(1.89) 
 
2.94*** 
(3.62) 
Target EBITDA/Sale 
0.11 
(0.57) 
0.10 
(0.49) 
0.02** 
(2.37) 
0.01 
(0.72) 
Target Market-to-Book 
Ratio 
-0.01 
(0.46) 
-0.01 
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.83) 
Enterprise Value/EBITDA 
0.02 
(1.41) 
0.02 
(1.49) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
0.02 
(0.72) 
Cross-Border Dummy 
5.12*** 
(2.96) 
5.18*** 
(2.96) 
6.84*** 
(3.77) 
6.96*** 
(3.87) 
Antidirector Rights Index   
2.29* 
(1.74) 
2.34** 
(2.45) 
LBO Dummy* Antidirector 
Rights Index 
   
3.31** 
(2.52) 
Creditor Rights Index   
-3.72*** 
(7.19) 
-2.97*** 
(5.22) 
LBO Dummy* Creditor 
Rights Index 
   
-3.67*** 
(5.73) 
Judicial Efficiency Index   
0.64 
(0.26) 
0.44 
(0.46) 
LBO Dummy* Judicial 
Efficiency Index 
   
3.16* 
(1.84) 
Common Law Origin    
10.27*** 
(3.65) 
10.29*** 
(3.80) 
Log(GDP per Capita)   
-0.59 
(0.39) 
-0.78 
(0.30) 
Target Herfindahl index    
-0.789 
(0.21) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 5305 5305 5305 5305 
Adjusted R
2  
0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 
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Table 8: Two-Stage Instrument Variable Regression of LBO Premiums in All Takeovers 
 
This table presents the two-stage treatment regression results on LBO premiums for all takeovers. The 
sample includes 844 LBOs worldwide and 4,461 other takeovers from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers 
that involve private targets, divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals 
with no premium data reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. In the first stage, the dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to one if a takeover deal is an LBO and zero if a non-LBO takeover. The 
instrument is the country-level FDI. In the second stage, the dependent variable is the LBO premium, and 
the independent variables include the logarithm of target market capitalization, the debt ratio, EBIDTA 
over sales, the market-to-book ratio, enterprise value over EBITDA, anti-director rights index, creditor 
rights index, a UK legal origin dummy, the judicial efficiency index, Herfindahl index, and the logarithm of 
the GDP per capita. We use clustered regressions that control for year, industry, and country fixed effects 
and report the heteroskedastically robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
 
 
First Stage Probit 
Regressions  
Second-Step Regressions 
 1 2 3 4 
 World 
Excluding 
U.S. 
World Excluding U.S. 
Log(Market Capitalization)   
-3.935*** 
(11.32) 
-2.364*** 
(7.49) 
Target Debt Ratio   
1.010 
(1.16) 
-2.207 
(0.78) 
Target EBITDA/Sales   
-0.067 
(0.49) 
-0.027 
(0.72) 
Target Market-to-Book Ratio   
0.022 
(1.12) 
0.021 
(1.32) 
Enterprise Value/EBITDA    
0.003 
(0.34) 
-0.005 
(0.57) 
Cross-Border Dummy   
6.168*** 
(5.55) 
7.233*** 
(7.02) 
Antidirector Rights Index   
7.456*** 
(4.81) 
6.648** 
(3.49) 
Creditor Rights Index   
-4.112*** 
(9.12) 
-1.093** 
(2.74) 
Common Law Origin    
0.101 
(0.06) 
-3.557** 
(2.70) 
Judicial Efficiency Index   
1.618** 
(2.23) 
2.112*** 
(3.79) 
Log(GDP per Capita)   
-3.351** 
(2.25) 
-5.067*** 
(4.45) 
Target Herfindahl index   
-2.545 
(0.68) 
-3.015 
(0.77) 
        ̂    
-6.396*** 
(3.43) 
-8.061*** 
(2.98) 
Log(Sales) 
0.092*** 
(5.48) 
0.098*** 
(4.75) 
  
Logarithm of FDI 
0.102*** 
(4.17) 
0.086** 
(2.52) 
  
Log(GDP per Capita) 
0.171** 
(2.23) 
0.181** 
(2.49) 
  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 5305 3236 5305 3236 
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P-value of Wald Test 0.00 0.00   
Adjusted R
2
    0.14 0.00 
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Table 9: LBO Premium Adjusted by a Benchmark Propensity Score 
 
This table reports the LBO premiums adjusted by a benchmark propensity score. The sample includes 844 
LBOs worldwide and 4,461 non-LBO takeovers from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers that involve 
private targets, divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals with no 
premium data reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. To report the propensity score-adjusted 
premiums (in percentages) for LBOs, we use all other takeovers as the treatment sample. As instruments, 
we use the target market cap, EBITDA over sales and the market-to-book ratio, interest expense over 
EBITDA, enterprise value over EBITDA, and the industry and year. The matching method uses Gaussian 
kernel weighted average. Each bootstrap has 50 replications with no replacement. We report the robust t-
statistic in parentheses. 
  
Adjusted Premium (treatment –control) Mean Mean 
p-value of  
difference 
 
UK legal  
origin  
Non-UK 
 legal origin 
 
Premium calculated at 1 day pre-announcement -7.79*** -12.84*** 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 week pre-announcement -10.99*** -12.98*** 0.03 
Premium calculated at 1 month pre-announcement -11.41 -13.64*** 0.04 
 
Good Anti-
director 
rights index 
(above 
median) 
Poor Anti-
director 
rights index 
(below 
median) 
 
Premium calculated at 1 day pre-announcement -8.37*** -14.90*** 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 week pre-announcement -11.40*** -13.16*** 0.01 
Premium calculated at 1 month pre-announcement -11.74*** -13.15*** 0.02 
 
Good Judicial 
efficiency 
index 
(above 
median) 
Poor Judicial 
efficiency 
index 
(below 
median) 
 
Premium calculated at 1 day pre-announcement -8.49*** -16.28*** 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 week pre-announcement -10.85*** -16.61*** 0.00 
Premium calculated at 1 month pre-announcement -10.94*** -21.64*** 0.00 
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Table 10: Two-Stage Instrument Variable Regression of LBO Premiums in Club Deals 
 
This table presents the two-stage results on LBO premiums for all LBOs, with the selection of club deals 
controlled for. The sample includes 844 LBOs worldwide from 1995 to 2007. We exclude LBOs that 
involve private targets, divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals with 
no premium data reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. In the first stage, the dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to one if LBO takeover deal is a club deal and zero otherwise. The instrument is 
the country-level FDI. The dependent variable is the LBO premium, and the independent variables include 
the logarithm of target market capitalization, the debt ratio, EBITDA/sales, the market-to-book ratio, 
enterprise value/EBITDA, the antidirector rights and creditor rights indices, the U.K. legal origin dummy, 
the judicial efficiency index, Herfindahl index, and the logarithm of the GDP per capita. We calculate the 
inverse Mills ratio from the first stage to control the second issues in the second stage regressions. We run 
regressions that control for year and industry fixed effects, cluster on country and report the 
heteroskedastically robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
 First-Step for Club LBOs Second-Step Regressions  
 1 2 3 4 
 World 
Excluding 
U.S. 
World 
Excluding 
U.S. 
Log(Market Capitalization)   
-4.000*** 
(3.75) 
-1.217 
(0.87) 
Target Debt Ratio   
-1.010 
(1.16) 
-5.493 
(0.77) 
Target EBITDA/Sale   
-0.223 
(0.78) 
-0.263 
(0.88) 
Target Market-to-Book Ratio   
-1.071* 
(1.79) 
-0.673 
(0.65) 
Enterprise Value/EBITDA   
0.014 
(0.39) 
0.038 
(0.73) 
Antidirector Rights Index   
6.632*** 
(4.19) 
4.173* 
(1.99) 
Creditor Rights Index   
-3.674*** 
(7.39) 
-0.600 
(0.34) 
UK Law Origin   
2.278 
(1.68) 
-11.289 
(1.58) 
Judicial Efficiency Index   
4.529** 
(2.20) 
4.857** 
(2.35) 
Log(GDP per Capita)   
-14.691*** 
(3.32) 
-17.636*** 
(3.86) 
Target Herfindahl index   
-9.159 
(1.10) 
-11.353 
(1.22) 
         ̂    
1.101 
(1.53) 
0.923 
(0.35) 
Log(Sales) 
0.303*** 
(6.58) 
0.340*** 
(4.56) 
  
Logarithm of FDI 
0.105* 
(1.91) 
0.006 
(1.63) 
  
Log(GDP per Capita) 
-0.088 
(0.47) 
-0.180 
(1.01) 
  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 844 481 844 481 
P-value of Wald Test 0.00 0.03   
Adjusted R
2
    0.14 0.08 
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Figure 1: Average Yearly Distribution of LBO Premiums and Deal Values 
 
This figure illustrates the average yearly distribution of LBO premiums and deal values. The sample 
contains 844 LBOs worldwide and 4,461 non-LBO takeovers from 1995 to 2007. We exclude takeovers 
that involve private targets, divisions of public companies, a deal value of less than $10 million, and deals 
with no premium data reported or an acquirer’s final stake less than 50%. We also include additional data 
(from Thomson Financials) on LBOs and other takeovers between 1985 and 1994. Panel A shows the 
average yearly premiums of LBOs and other takeovers from 1985 to 2007; Panel B shows the average 
yearly premiums of club and non-club LBOs from 1995 to 2007. The dashed line represents LBOs in Panel 
A and club LBOs in Panel B, and the solid line represents strategic takeovers in Panel A and non-club 
LBOs in Panel B, respectively. We calculate the premium as the offer price over the stock price one day 
prior to the announcement minus one. 
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Panel B: Average yearly premiums for club LBOs and non-club LBOs 
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Appendix I. Definition of key institutional variables related to institutions and LBOs 
 
This table summarizes the definitions of the key institutional variables, which include common law legal 
origins, GDP per capita, the antidirector rights index, the judicial efficiency index, and the creditor rights 
index. 
 
Institutional Variables Explanations 
Common Law Legal 
Origin  
Equals one if the origin of the company law or commercial code of the 
country is English common law and zero otherwise. Source: LLSV 
(1997). 
GDP per Capita Gross national income per capita. Source: World Development Indicators 
(2005). 
FDI Foreign direct investment. Source: World Bank Country Database. 
Antidirector Rights 
Index 
Formed by adding one when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy votes, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares 
prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is 
allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for 
an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10% of the 
sample median, or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only 
be waived by a shareholder meeting. The range for the index is from zero 
to six. Source: LLSV (1997) and Spamann (2009). We use LLSV (1997) 
measures in this paper thoroughly. 
Judicial Efficiency Index  Assessment of efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it 
affects businesses, particularly foreign firms, based on the International 
Business Corporation’s rating of the country’s risk, which “may be taken 
to represent investor’s assessments of conditions in the country in 
question.” We take the averages between 1980 and 1983, scaled from 
zero to 10, with lower scores signaling a lower efficiency level.      
Creditor Rights Index An index aggregating creditor rights: A score of one is assigned when 
each of the following rights of secured lenders are defined in the laws 
and regulations: First, there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or 
minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization. Second, 
secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after a reorganization 
petition is approved; that is, there is no automatic stay or asset freeze. 
Third, secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a 
bankrupt firm, as opposed to other creditors such as the government. 
Finally, management does not retain administration of its property 
pending the resolution of reorganization. The index ranges from zero 
(weak creditor rights) to four (strong creditor rights) and is constructed in 
January for every year from 1978 to 2003. Source: LLSV (1998) and 
Djankov et al. (2007). We use LLSV(1998) measures in the paper 
thoroughly.  
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Appendix II. Institutional environment variables in sample countries 
This table displays the scores of each institutional variable for each country, obtained from Andrei 
Shleifer’s website at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset. The antidirector rights 
index includes the version of  LLSV (1997) and a revised version by Spamann (2009). The creditor rights 
index includes version of LLSV (1998) and a revised version by Djankov et al. (2007).  
 
Common 
Law Legal 
Origin 
Antidirector 
Rights 
(LLSV, 
1997) 
Antidirector  
Right 
(Spamann, 
2009) 
Judicial 
Efficiency 
Index 
Creditor 
Rights 
(LLSV, 
19972      1998) 
Creditor 
Rights 
(Djankov et 
al., 2007) 
Argentina  0 4 3 6 1 1 
Australia  1 4 4 10 1 3 
Austria  0 2 4 9.5 3 3 
Belgium  0 0 3 9.5 2 3 
Brazil  0 3 5 5.75 1 1 
Canada  1 5 4 9.25 1 1 
Chile  0 5 5 7.25 2 2 
Colombia  0 3 4 7.25 0 0 
Denmark  0 2 4 10 3 3 
Finland  0 3 2 10 1 1 
France  0 3 4 8 0 0 
Germany  0 1 4 9 3 3 
Greece  0 2 5 7 1 1 
Hong Kong  1 5 4 10 4 4 
India  1 5 4 8 4 2 
Indonesia  0 2 4 2.5 4 2 
Ireland  1 4 4 8.75 1 1 
Israel  1 3 3 10 4 3 
Italy  0 1 2 6.75 2 2 
Japan  0 4 5 10 2 3 
Malaysia 1 4 4 9 4 3 
Mexico  0 1 2 6 0 0 
Netherlands  0 2 4 10 2 3 
New Zealand  1 4 5 10 3 4 
Norway  0 4 4 10 2 2 
Pakistan  1 5 5 5 4 1 
Peru  0 3 4 6.75 0 0 
Philippines 0 3 4 4.75 0 1 
Portugal  0 3 3 5.5 1 1 
Singapore  1 4 4 10 4 3 
South Africa  1 5 5 6 3 3 
South Korea  0 2 4 6 3 3 
Spain  0 4 5 6.25 2 2 
Sri Lanka  1 3 4 7 3 2 
Sweden  0 3 4 10 2 1 
Switzerland  0 2 3 10 1 1 
Taiwan  0 3 5 6.75 2 2 
Thailand  1 2 4 3.25 3 3 
Turkey  0 2 4 4 2 2 
UK  1 5 4 10 4 4 
U.S. 1 5 2 10 1 1 
Venezuela  0 1 2 6.5 3 3 
Zimbabwe  1 3 4 7.5 4 4 
 
 
 
